



Terrorism and Targeted Violence Incident Response Plan



AUTHORITY AND ADOPTION LETTER

EXECUTIVE SIGNATORY PAGE

The most fundamental function of government is providing for the safety and welfare of the public. An effective Terrorism and Targeted Violence program is essential to ensuring the state of Hawai'i fulfills this responsibility when our residents and visitors are threatened or impacted by such incidents.

The State of Hawai'i ***Terrorism and Targeted Violence Incident Response Plan*** establishes the framework our State Government will use to organize and coordinate its response activities for a coordinated approach to protect against, prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorism and targeted violence-related incidents.

This annex outlines organizations, actions, and responsibilities of state and county departments and agencies and identifies how they will work together to ensure the state is prepared to execute a well-coordinated, timely and consistent response. It is intended to be a living document that evolves and improves as the outcomes of ongoing planning efforts, exercises and real-world events are incorporated.

This plan is written in accordance with Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) Chapter 128A, Homeland Security, and applies to all state departments including agencies, offices, institutions of higher education, commissions, boards, and councils. This plan does not direct the emergency operations of local governments, federal agencies, private sector, or non-governmental organizations. However, it does provide a reference for their response plans, procedures, and actions.

It is important to emphasize that responsibility for the initial response and management of an emergency rests with the affected entity(ies), to include local jurisdictions. The state's response supports state government efforts when additional resources are required or not available within the affected entity. This plan describes how those state resources will be activated, requested, and coordinated to complement response efforts.

This document is maintained by the Hawai'i State Office of Homeland Security (OHS) with input from state departments and agencies.

I hereby promulgate and adopt the State of Hawai'i ***Terrorism and Targeted Violence Incident Response Plan*** to the *Hawai'i Emergency Operations Plan*.

Frank J. Pace, Administrator
Office of Homeland Security
Hawai'i Department of Law Enforcement
January 2, 2026



RECORD OF APPROVAL

Approval #	Approval Date	Approval Authority	Type of Approval
2			
1			



RECORD OF CHANGES

Change Number	Date of Change	Page or Section Changed	Summary of Change	Authorization Signature	Date of Signature
1					
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6					
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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 PURPOSE

The purpose of this Terrorism and Targeted Violence Incident Response Plan to the State of Hawai'i *Emergency Operations Plan (SEOP)* is to communicate the special roles, responsibilities, and actions that are needed to address a terrorist or targeted violence incident in the State of Hawai'i.

Because terrorism and targeted violence incidents have an element of preventability and of intent that natural hazards lack, this Plan has a unique focus on prevention activities such as monitoring and detection that do not apply to natural hazards.

This Plan serves as the mechanism to provide state support to local or federal jurisdictions with law enforcement, public safety, and security operations in response to terrorism or targeted violence incidents in conjunction with or as the cause of activation of the *SEOP*.

This Plan applies to all threats and/or acts of terrorism or targeted violence occurring within the State of Hawai'i.

1.2 SCOPE

This Plan applies to all state agencies with responsibilities listed herein.

This Plan addresses both terrorism and targeted violence, which correlates with the federal government's increasing recognition that the two topics are intertwined and interrelated.

This Plan recognizes that incidents characterized as terrorism or targeted violence may consist of many types of threats. The scope of this Plan is limited to acts of mass violence that do not necessitate hyper-specialized aspects of response. Categories of acts of terrorism or targeted violence that are addressed in this Plan include:

- Mass shootings.
- Arson or fire as a weapon.
- Bombings/explosions.
- Kidnapping or hostage-taking.
- Vehicular attacks.
- Other violent attacks meeting the definition of targeted violence, such as stabbings or active-shooter attacks.

Though many aspects of this Plan apply to all types of terrorism and targeted violence (e.g., public alert and warning), this Plan acknowledges that the following types of terrorism have hyper-specialized aspects of response as to warrant separate planning processes and documentation. Types of terrorism that are *not addressed in this Plan* include:

- Cyberterrorism.
- Chemical incidents, including the use of chemical warfare agents such as nerve, blister, choking, and blood agents.
- Biological incidents.
- Radiological incidents.
- Nuclear incidents.



- Explosive incidents that would be covered in a *SEOP* Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive (CBRNE) Incident Plan.

Broader response topics not addressed in this Plan, unless there are special considerations that need to be developed for terrorism and targeted violence, include fatality management for mass fatality incidents.

1.2.1 RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER PLANS

This Plan is an Annex to the *SEOP*, which is the state's all-hazards plan that establishes the framework used to coordinate the state response to, and initial recovery from, emergencies and disasters. This Plan addresses unique planning and response requirements for terrorism and targeted violence incidents but is not intended to duplicate or alter the response concepts outlined in the *SEOP*.

Additionally, this Plan is not intended to duplicate or alter other Plans to the *SEOP* or any of the State Emergency Support Function (SESF) Plans that may have bearing on acts of terrorism or targeted violence (e.g., SESF #9: Search and Rescue, SESF #10: Oil and Hazardous Materials).



2. SITUATION AND ASSUMPTIONS

2.1 SITUATION OVERVIEW

This section provides an overview of terrorism and targeted violence threats to and vulnerabilities of the State of Hawaii. This information is intended to provide a broad understanding and should be considered in conjunction with other statewide documents such as the *HI-EOP* and the *THIRA*.

The most recent Homeland Threat Assessment indicates threats of violence from violent extremists radicalized in the U.S. will remain high but largely unchanged from 2023. Bad actors will continue to be inspired and motivated by a mix of conspiracy theories, personalized grievances, and enduring racial, ethnic, religious, and anti-government ideologies generally spread online. Collectively, in 2024 fatal attacks in the U.S. focused on a variety of targets, including law enforcement, government, faith-based organizations, retail locations, ethnic and religious minorities, healthcare infrastructure, transportation, and the energy sector.¹

Shifts in domestic terrorism activity can occur quickly and frequently, depending on changes in political or social circumstances, requiring law enforcement to remain alert to all forms of potential domestic terrorism. Because domestic terrorism requires political or social motivation, the potential for changes in these areas to produce quick swings in activity remains significant. Events such as elections, new legislation, and social justice-related incidents all have the potential to spark activity in previously dormant movements or see the emergence of new domestic terrorism actors.²

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines domestic terrorism as violent, criminal acts committed by individuals and/or groups to further ideological goals stemming from domestic influences, such as those of a political, religious, social, racial, or environmental nature. Generally, domestic terrorists maintain that force or violence is an acceptable means to accomplish their goals. This may include those who justify force against critical infrastructure and those who justify the use of violence against people, or individuals who view violence as a valid means to their perceived goals.

The threat of gun violence is ever present. Firearms recently became the leading cause of death for children and teenagers in the U.S., and homicides accounted for the majority of gun deaths among this age group.³ In 2021, there were a total of 3,849 violent crimes reported across the State of Hawaii, with 39 reported murders. Of these murders, firearms were used in 43.6% of the incidents reported.⁴

2.1.1 THREAT ANALYSIS

In the State of Hawaii, the Hawaii State Fusion Center (HSFC) assesses that threats of terrorism and targeted violence are most likely to be generated by:

¹ (U) United States Department of Homeland Security (2023, September). Homeland Security Threat Assessment 2024. Retrieved on 2025, February 4 from, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2023-09/23_0913_ia_23-333-ia_u_homeland-threat-assessment-2024_508C_V6_13Sep23.pdf

² (U) Texas Department of Public Safety (TDPS), *Texas Domestic Terrorism Threat Assessment*, January 2020.

https://www.dps.texas.gov/director_staff/media_and_communications/2020/txTerrorThreatAssessment.pdf This resource was used for information that pertains not just to Texas.

³ (U) USA Today, (13 September 2024). Guns Remain Leading Cause of Death for Children and Teens in the U.S. Retrieved on 11 February 2025 from, <https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2024/09/13/guns-children-teenagers-united-states-report/75198121007/>

⁴ (U) State of Hawaii Attorney General's Office (2024, August). Crime in Hawaii: 2021 A Review of Uniform Crime Reports. Retrieved on 2025, January 27 from, <https://ag.hawaii.gov/cjia/files/2024/08/Crime-in-Hawaii-2021.pdf>



- foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs), homegrown violent extremists (HVEs), domestic violent extremists (DVEs), and unaffiliated lone offenders seeking to cause mass casualty incidents and/or attract attention to ideological causes at special events with large attendance and media coverage, such as the annual Honolulu Marathon and Ironman World Championship;
- malicious actors seeking opportunistic access to target local, state and U.S. critical infrastructure sectors in Hawaii with disruptive and destructive physical attacks and cyberattacks; and
- actors threatening mass violence in Hawaii schools.

2.1.2 VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS

This section provides an overview of key geographic, demographic, and infrastructure vulnerabilities that may have significant consequences for how the state is affected by, responds to, and recovers from a terrorism or targeted violence incident.

High Tourism/Special Event Locations. Year-round tourism brings notoriety to various locations in Hawaii, making those locations high-value targets for bad actors. The HSFC assesses that Hawaii's popular tourist sites and large-scale special events are likely top targets for potential terrorism or targeted violence threats.

- The Honolulu Marathon, staged in the Waikiki area, typically includes an estimated 30,000 registrants. The Ironman World Championship, staged in Kona area on Hawaii island, typically attracts several thousand spectators. These events and other high-profile, televised events with large attendances may draw individuals and groups wanting to engage in First Amendment-protected activities. Malicious actors looking for targets of opportunity may target these individuals and groups, as well as law enforcement and security elements, in acts of targeted violence, criminal schemes, or opportunistic clashes with ideological opponents. Among concerns at large-scale public events: vehicle-ramming tactics and hazards posed by unauthorized unmanned aircraft system (UAS) operation.

Critical Infrastructure Sectors. The HSFC assesses the State of Hawaii's critical infrastructure framework is a likely top target for potential physical and cyber threats.

- The energy sector powers much of Hawaii's critical infrastructure, making it an attractive target to bad actors and terrorists. Energy infrastructure is geographically dispersed, often crossing multiple jurisdictional boundaries. Energy assets and systems can be owned by private, federal, state, or local entities that serve the public. The HSFC assesses Hawaii's energy sector is easily accessible and little preparation is required to plan an attack that could result in a potentially devastating outcome throughout the islands.
- Aviation is an essential component of transportation-related critical infrastructure as it serves as the primary mode of transportation to and from the islands. An increased popularity in UAS operations among hobbyists and others is identified as a safety concern for airport security as aftermarket modifications can pose a significant danger to public safety.
- The maritime sector is an attractive target due to heavy reliance on shipping to maintain food and fuel supplies in Hawaii. An inoperable Port of Honolulu would severely hinder the state's operational supply chain. Due to limited on-island restoration supplies, equipment and specialty personnel, full port restoration would likely take months and require out-of-state assistance.⁵

Education Institutions. The HSFC assesses that while actual threat of mass violence in Hawaii schools is low, gang-related violence and other criminal activities occurring in surrounding communities (off-campus) have involved

⁵ (U) United States Coast Guard. Hawaii Maritime Transportation System Response Plan and Salvage Recovery Plan



students and, in turn, impacted school safety and security. Nationwide, the overall increase in firearm violence affecting juveniles and the ongoing increase in school shootings in other states have the potential to impact Hawaii. Further, Hawaii education institutions are targets for hoax school threats.

Related Concerns. The HSFC assesses that local, state and federal government facilities in Hawaii as well as military and law enforcement facilities in the islands are likely targets for potential terrorism or targeted violence threats tied to political, religious, anti-government, societal, or ideological beliefs and grievances.

- **Government Facilities:** In the State of Hawaii, the federal government owns 20.2% of land including approximately 253,000 acres of submerged lands and waters within the Hawaiian Islands National Wildlife Refuge.⁶ These buildings, including federal agency offices, remain targets for malicious, bad actors through physical intrusion and network intrusion to gain information regarding U.S. systems and/or government held data. International conflict and geopolitical tensions can increase interest in targeting government buildings.
- **Military and Law Enforcement Facilities:** There are 15 U.S. military bases located throughout Hawaii, including the headquarters for the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. Military bases have become an increasingly popular target for bad actors. There are either federal, state, and/or local law enforcement facilities located in every county in Hawaii, with a similar level of threat.
- **Cyberthreats:** While this plan does not cover cyberattacks or other cyber threats, many CCTAs may include cross-cutting methodologies that could include a cyber component. A well-executed cyberattack would likely include impacts on vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure and the public. Currently, cyberattack planning and critical infrastructure hardening is the responsibility of each department. In the future, coordinated statewide cyber recommendations will be critical. In 2024, Hawaii had 2,806 complaints of cybercrimes reported to the FBI's IC3 with losses totaling \$55,180,901 ranking 39th out of the 57 states and U.S. territories.⁷

2.2 ASSUMPTIONS

The State of Hawai'i and people within, including both residents and visitors, are potentially at risk from an act of terrorism or targeted violence.

A terrorist threat or incident may occur at any time of day with little or no warning, may involve single or multiple geographic areas, and may result in mass casualties.

Targets may include physical infrastructure or individuals and groups.

Coordination between law enforcement, public safety, and emergency management personnel is vital to ensure appropriate readiness actions are taken while still protecting law enforcement sources and methods.

The consequences (or cascading effects) of terrorism could outlast or surpass an initiating event. Effects may include long-term health and medical problems, extended economic issues, or political and social concerns.

A terrorist or targeted violence incident may be readily apparent to a responding organization or may be very difficult to initially detect and identify because of uncertainty about the cause or extent of the situation.

⁶ (U) Congressional Research Service (2018). Federal Land Ownership: Overview and Data. Retrieved on 2022, December 8 from, <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R42346>

⁷ (U) FBI (2024). Internet Crime Report, 2024. Retrieved from https://www.ic3.gov/AnnualReport/Reports/2024_IC3Report.pdf.



Prevention methods are implemented to keep a terrorist attack or targeted violence incident from occurring. Prevention consists of those activities that serve to prevent, avoid, or stop an imminent, threatened, or actual act of terrorism against Hawai'i, its population, and its interests. These activities decrease the perpetrators' chance of success, mitigate attack impact, minimize attack visibility, increase the chance of apprehension or detection, and prevent perpetrators' access to resources.

First responder entities have situational awareness of potential threats and potential threat elements.

The State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) will be activated for any act of terrorism and some acts of targeted violence.

The resources and/or expertise of local agencies could be quickly depleted by a response to a major terrorist incident and its consequences.

A terrorist event may create a level of disaster requiring federal assistance.

No single agency at the local, state, federal, or private level possesses the authority and the expertise to act unilaterally on many difficult issues that may arise in response to threats or acts of terrorism. Terrorism requires law enforcement, public safety, public health, and emergency management coordination.

The response to a threat or actual incident involves law enforcement and investigative activity as an integrated element.

Virtually all terrorist acts involve violations of laws. Therefore, law enforcement agencies gather and analyze intelligence on terrorists and may develop estimates of their intentions. Access to this criminal intelligence information may be limited, but significant threats must be communicated by law enforcement agencies to those local officials who can implement protective measures and alert the public.

The suspected or actual involvement of terrorists adds an additional dimension to incident management.

There are often competing needs in the aftermath of a terrorist act - law enforcement agencies want to protect the crime scene to gather evidence, while emergency responders may need to bring in extensive equipment and personnel to conduct search and rescue operations. It is essential for the incident command team to establish operating areas and formulate a plan of action which considers the needs of both groups.

Injuries from a terrorist attack may be both physical and psychological.

Recovery from a terrorist attack can be complicated by the presence of additional threats, extensive physical damages, and mass casualties.

Although this Plan takes into consideration the most probable scenarios relating to the primary categories of terrorism incidents, no assumptions should be made to the Plan being all-inclusive of every possible situation that a terrorism incident could create. Emergency responders will assess the situation and determine the best course of action based on their training and prescribed policies, plans, and procedures.



3. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

3.1 COUNTY GOVERNMENTS

Maintain regular preparedness activities, including developing and maintaining an up-to-date emergency operations plan (EOP) and supporting Plans.

Local jurisdictions maintain primary responsibility for coordinating initial response activities.

County jurisdictions will follow policies and procedures as outlined in respective EOP and Plans.

The primary responsibility of county governments is to provide an initial response to save lives and protect public health, safety, property, and the environment.

3.1.1 LAW ENFORCEMENT

Conduct anti-terrorist operations and maintain terrorist profile information. Advise emergency management staff and state and federal agencies of significant terrorist threats.

Conduct terrorism response training programs for law enforcement personnel and support public education and awareness activities.

Establish an ICP at the scene to manage on-scene incident response and transition responsibility to state or federal agency, if necessary. The Incident Commander will:

- Determine and implement immediate protective actions for emergency responders and the public in the vicinity of the incident site.
- Establish communications.
- Provide an initial incident assessment, request additional resources if needed, and provide periodic updates to the EOC.
- Request a liaison officer from each participating agency is present at the ICP, if necessary.
- Establish a specific division of responsibilities between the incident command operation and the EOC.
- Alert the EOC of the need for additional resources or mutual aid.
- Transition the incident command operation to a unified command operation when external resources arrive.

Establish and maintain the perimeter around the incident site and neutralize the threat.

Alert the County Warning Point of the situation.

Manage traffic and crowd control measures and conduct evacuation measures, if necessary.

Brief emergency response personnel on crime scene protection.

Assign personnel to the Joint Information Center (JIC).

Notify state and federal authorities of terrorism (if suspected) and:

- Coordinate the deployment and operation of counter-terrorist response elements.



- Coordinate and conduct reconnaissance in the vicinity of the incident site to identify threats from secondary attacks of cascading effects.
- Coordinate to investigate the incident and identify and apprehend suspects.

Coordinate and conduct improvised explosive device (IED) operations during incidents, including:

- Conducting an initial assessment of IED or suspicious device and requesting appropriate assets.
- Rendering IED safe.
- Establishing “safety zones” for emergency responders and victims, if needed.

3.1.2 FIRE, HAZARDOUS MATERIAL, EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES, AND MEDICAL EXAMINER

Conduct terrorism response training programs and participate in training drills and activities.

Assign personnel to the ICP and establish a unified command.

Assign personnel to the JIC.

3.1.2.1 FIRE

Coordinate and conduct all fire and rescue operations during incidents, including:

- Dispatching and deploying fire personnel and equipment during an emergency.
- Identifying requirements for debris clearance to expedite fire response and search and rescue.
- Controlling fires, if necessary.
- Conducting search and rescue operations as needed.
- Identifying unsafe structures and restricting access pending further evaluation by the Public Works or Engineering staff.
- Providing support for evacuation operations if requested.

3.1.2.2 HAZARDOUS MATERIAL

Coordinate and conduct hazardous materials (Hazmat) operations during incidents, including:

- Establishing “safety zones” and decontamination area for emergency responders and victims, if needed.
- Carrying out initial decontamination of victims, if required. Procedures must be available for emergency decontamination of large numbers of people.
- Coordinating with medical facilities to ensure monitoring and decontamination of victim intake.

3.1.2.3 EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES

Coordinate and conduct emergency medical operations during incidents, including:

- Responding to medical emergency calls and providing emergency medical care to the injured.
- Establishing a triage area, if necessary.
- Managing and conducting timely patient transport to appropriate medical facilities.

3.1.2.4 MEDICAL EXAMINER



Coordinate and conduct medical examiner functions during incidents, including:

- Managing decedents located in unstable or hazardous environments and ensuring scene safety during triage and recovery.
- Utilizing fingerprints, dental records, radiology, DNA, and personal effects for identification, especially during high-volume events.
- Establishing a Case Management System to maintain standardized fields for location, physical descriptors, associated property, photographic documentation, and chain-of-custody milestones.
- Assisting in the investigation by determining the cause(s) of death(s).

3.1.3 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

Coordinate regularly with law enforcement and other response agencies with respect to the terrorist threat to:

- Determine appropriate readiness actions during periods of increased threat.
- Develop common communication procedures.
- Conduct terrorism response training programs and participate in training drills and activities.
- Maintain countywide plans and procedures.

Activate and staff local EOC(s). Responsibilities of EOC personnel include but are not limited to:

- Notifying the SWP.
- Requesting and managing mutual aid.
- Developing and transmitting situation reports to the SEOC as the emergency unfolds and changes.

Notify, brief, and advise elected officials.

Assign personnel to the JIC.

Notify the Crime Victim Compensation Commission (CVCC), which can provide services including:

- Deploying to response locations as directed by the EOC.
- Mobilizing mass violence response team and mass violence incident response notification system.
- Providing victim assistance services, such as:
 - Physical, mental, and behavioral health support
 - Victim compensation
 - Financial assistance
- Prepare incident-specific assessment of immediate, short-term, and long-term victim needs.
- Support long-term recovery operations for victims.

Notify state and federal agencies, as appropriate and as outlined in this Plan.

Coordinate Family Assistance Center (FAC) and Victim Identification Center (VIC) operations with law enforcement, state agencies, and NGO partners.

3.1.4 ELECTED OFFICIALS

Provide policy guidance with a response to anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism programs.

Declare a countywide emergency.

Request assistance from the state.



Assign personnel to the JIC.

3.1.5 OTHER COUNTY DEPARTMENTS

Provide personnel, equipment, and supply support for emergency operations upon request from the EOC.

Assign personnel to the EOC.

Activate the DOC.

3.2 STATE GOVERNMENT

3.2.1 OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR

Provide policy guidance with response to anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism programs.

Provide general direction for response and recovery operations in the aftermath of a terrorism incident.

Review and coordinate public release of information related to emergency activities.

Establish a Policy Group at the SEOC.

Assign personnel to the JIC and/or JFO.

Declare a state-level emergency.

Request federal level assets in support of the response.

Request a federal emergency declaration.

3.2.2 DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT

Serve as the primary state agency for law enforcement operations, intelligence, traffic and crowd control.

Provide technical response assistance to local jurisdictions at the scene of a terrorist incident.

Coordinate investigative efforts with appropriate local and state law enforcement agencies.

3.2.2.1 OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Provide technical assistance and advice to state departments, agencies, and local jurisdictions in counter- and anti-terrorism planning, training, and exercises, when requested.

Prepare comprehensive plans and programs for homeland security and facilitate the implementation and maintenance of these plans.

Develop and maintain this Plan; ensure its consistency with State and Federal guidelines and regulations.



Facilitate the processes needed to respond to and recover from a homeland security-related incident including a coordinated comprehensive planning program.

Ensure coordination and cooperation among all partner organizations for homeland security; public agencies, including county, state, and federal agencies; and private organizations.

Develop and maintain lists of critical infrastructure and conduct studies and surveys of the vulnerabilities of same; participate in planning efforts to mitigate identified critical infrastructure risks.

Develop and maintain a capability to process security clearance applications.

Foster coordination on security matters within the Pacific region, such as coordinating planning efforts and sponsoring discussions, seminars, and conferences.

Support coordination across federal, state, and local agencies during after-action reporting and recovery.

3.2.2.1.1 STATE FUSION CENTER

Evaluate the nature, credibility, and implications of the threat; manage the intelligence and information monitoring of a terrorism or targeted violence incident on the state level.

Assign personnel to embed at critical incident response or coordination sites to ensure critical intelligence sharing.

Share intelligence with limited key federal, state, and local government officials in accordance with protected information sharing protocols and the needs of the decision makers.

3.2.3 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

3.2.3.1 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY

Manage the response of a terrorism or targeted violence incident at the state level through facilitating the incident management at a statewide level.

Maintain SWP to receive notification from local EOCs and take immediate and appropriate actions.

Activate and staff the SEOC as appropriate based on the incident and coordinate the response from the state level. Responsibilities of SEOC personnel include but are not limited to:

- Serving as the point of contact for communications between state and local responding agencies.
- Coordinating and managing resource management and mutual aid.
- Compiling information regarding state and local preparedness status or needs.

Assign personnel to any or all of the following locations:

- Local ICPs
- Local EOCs
- JIC
- DOCs
- State Emergency Response Team (SERT)
- Policy Group
- Joint Field Office (JFO)



Establish the process for information sharing with key state and local government officials regarding the situation.

Provide support to all ongoing response operations as needed.

Coordinate CVCC support and FAC and VIC operations with local jurisdictions, other state agencies, and NGO partners.

3.2.3.2 NATIONAL GUARD

Prepare and conduct force protection training for state and local agencies, as requested.

Provide logistics support, as requested.

Provide support by ensuring that the Civil Support Team (CST) is prepared for emergency response. To request CST support, local jurisdictions should submit a request for assistance through the local EOC.

3.2.4 STATE EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTION (SESF) LEAD AGENCIES

Update policies, procedures, and emergency notification procedures to reflect organizational changes or additions.

Ensure development of any specialized procedures necessary to implement any applicable responsibilities of this Plan.

Assign personnel to the SEOC and coordinate required actions involved in SESF response as outlined in the *SEOP*.

3.3 FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

3.3.1 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI) UNDER THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (DOJ)

Provide technical assistance and advice to state departments, agencies, and local jurisdictions in counter- and anti-terrorism planning, training, and exercises, when requested.

Serve as the lead federal agency for crisis management during a terrorism or targeted violence event, including serving as the lead law enforcement authority for investigation and recovery of evidence.

Provide technical response assistance to local jurisdictions at the scene of a terrorist incident.

Notify other federal agencies, including DHS, FEMA, and members of the National Intelligence Council, of a significant threat.

3.3.2 DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (DHS)

Review and analyze intelligence and threat information as requested by the FBI.

Decide, in coordination with other federal entities, whether a National Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS) Alert should be issued. NTAS Alerts will only be issued when intelligence has been deemed credible.



Assign personnel to the JFO or near the projected incident location if requested by the FBI.

Support investigative actions as requested by the FBI.

3.3.2.1 FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY

Serve as the lead federal agency for consequence management and operate as defined in the National Response Framework (NRF).

Assign personnel to the JFO or near the projected incident location if requested by the FBI.

The FEMA Region IX Administrator will activate the Regional Response Coordination Center to support federal regional response coordination when deemed necessary based on potential consequences of the incident.

Provide assistance, as requested from local jurisdictions and/or state agencies. The NRF provides an outline for the coordination of federal support agencies.

3.3.3 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD)

Maintain equipment to support OHS or other partners during a homeland security-related incident.

Utilize intelligence and information monitoring capabilities for situational awareness and operational readiness.

Serve as the lead response agency for any incident on military property, including any military bases or housing.

Serve as a support agency for any incident involving military personnel.

Assign personnel to the JOC as requested by the FBI.

Provide logistics support in accordance with federal laws and operational capabilities.

Maintain responsibility for military assets, including potentially executing lockdown procedures on military property, if necessary.

3.4 NON-GOVERNMENTAL AND VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS AND PRIVATE SECTOR

NGOs, voluntary organizations, and private sector partners with disaster response missions and/or programs that support the state's emergency planning and response efforts are assigned to SESFs as outlined in the *SEOP*.

Provide information, resources, or disaster relief services as defined in this plan, and/or as outlined in their respective charters, bylaws, or agreements with state agencies.

Provide support with FAC and VIC operations as well as long-term recovery operations.

3.4.1 TOURISM/VISITOR INDUSTRY



The Hawai‘i Tourism Authority (HTA) maintains a support role in emergency response.

During a terrorism or targeted violence incident, HTA will activate the agency’s DOC and staff the SEOC. Typically, HTA personnel will staff SESF #15 positions.

Provide public safety information to visitors and tourists.

Support visitor evacuation, if necessary.

Support recovery actions and combat public misinformation and rumor control.



4. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

This section provides an overview of how the State of Hawai'i will coordinate the response to an actual or threatened act of terrorism or targeted violence, as defined in Section 1.2, including plan activation and the anticipated sequence of emergency events and priorities during each phase.

This section builds upon the Concept of Operations listed in the *SEOP*.

The Department of Homeland Security *Strategy for Countering Terrorism and Targeted Violence* outlines four goals that are aimed at enhancing prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery from acts of terrorism and targeted violence. The State of Hawai'i subscribes to these goals as the foundation for its own efforts:

Goal 1: Understand the evolving terrorism and targeted violence threat environment, and support partners in the homeland security enterprise through this specialized knowledge.

Goal 2: Prevent terrorists and other hostile actors from entering the U.S. and deny them the opportunity to exploit the Nation's trade, immigration, and domestic and international travel systems.

Goal 3: Prevent terrorism and targeted violence.

Goal 4: Enhance U.S. infrastructure protections and community preparedness.

4.1 RESPONSE ACTIONS

4.1.1 PLAN ACTIVATION

This document is an integrated part of the *SEOP* which outlines basic response practices. This plan provides an additional set of procedures that will be activated due to suspected terrorism or targeted violence threat or actual event(s) within the State of Hawai'i.

The activation of this plan will be at the discretion of the OHS with a recommendation by the Hawai'i Emergency Management Agency (HI-EMA). This plan will be activated if there is a potential for an event to be terroristic or targeted violence in nature, even if it is not definitively determined to be a terroristic event. Law enforcement entities determine if a threat or incident may potentially be terrorism or targeted violence or if there is intelligence connecting the incident to a known entity as a part of the initial situation assessment. Law enforcement threat findings will influence plan activation.

4.1.2 INITIAL RESPONSE

Any incident will likely be identified at the local level through a law enforcement entity. During/after an incident, 9-1-1 is typically notified through public reaction and local law enforcement is dispatched to the incident location. When local law enforcement assesses the incident to which they are responding is a possible terrorism or targeted violence incident, they will alert dispatch, who also acts as the County Warning Point of the situation, and if necessary, the local Emergency Operations Center (EOC) will be activated.

- Local EOC staffing will include the local Emergency Management or Civil Defense Agency (CDA) along with all relevant EOC positions and partners.



- The local EOC will notify the State Warning Point (SWP) of activation.
- The SWP will notify the Hawai'i State Fusion Center (HSFC); the HSFC will alert OHS (including the Governor's Homeland Security Advisor (HSA) and Deputy Homeland Security Advisor (DHSA)).
- The Department of Law Enforcement (DLE) Department Operations Center (DOC) and the SEOC may be activated, if necessary. The state and local EOCs, under advisement from the HSA/DHSA will determine the need for further escalation for federal assets.

Early official communications regarding an incident will be limited based on the details known. Only verified facts should be disseminated, and rumors or speculations should not be communicated. Type of information communicated may include:

- Facts that are known about the incident.
- Location of the incident.
- Time/date of the incident.
- Populations affected by the incident.
- The incident perpetrator(s) if known.

Initial response objectives for all jurisdictions should be in support of life safety, incident stabilization, protection of property and the economy, and preservation of culture and the environment. This will likely include a focus on:

- Initial law enforcement response.
- Threat neutralization actions.
- Emergency medical services (EMS) response.
- Implementing lifeline stabilization targets.
- Initial targeted information distribution to the public, responders, and government entities.
- Intelligence and investigation activities.
- Healthcare surge capacity and stabilization.

The locally affected county or jurisdiction is designated as the initial primary responder. Key responsibilities of the affected county or jurisdiction include:

- Save lives.
- Establish response operations.
- Protect property.
- Incident scene management.
- Threat identification and neutralization.
- Establish initial communications.
- Establish EOC operations.
- Activate responders and auxiliary support, to include notification of Crime Victims Compensation Commission (CVCC) of the incident.
- Enact processes to request additional support as necessary.
- Establish medical procedures and surge capacity at the hospital level.
- Establish vertical communication including with HI-EMA and OHS.
- Declare county-level emergency, if necessary.

Other counties that are unaffected by the event may support the primary response jurisdiction. Key responsibilities of support jurisdictions unaffected by the event include:

- EOC activation at a minimum level to support resource coordination and mutual aid to impacted jurisdictions.
- Enact protective measures within the jurisdiction to reduce the risk of secondary threats.



- Establish resource and personnel support protocols dependent on the situation and the risk of further attacks.

If necessary, the state will support response, as needed by the local or affected jurisdiction. All state agencies are responsible for coordinated response efforts through key tasks including:

- Activate the SEOC.
- Resource coordination and mutual aid in support of the affected local jurisdictions.
- Declare state-level emergency, if necessary.
- Request federal level assets in support of the response.
- Request for a federal emergency declaration, if necessary.

If an incident is assessed by the local law enforcement entity to be tied to a terrorism event, additional protective measures may be put into place starting from the local level and potentially including statewide assets, including but not limited to similar targets, facilities, or other known vulnerabilities.

Any suspected threat should produce law enforcement searches for additional threats. It is the responsibility of the local jurisdiction to identify additional potential threats at the incident site, as well as potential secondary targets in the jurisdiction.

4.1.3 SUSTAINED RESPONSE

Sustained response objectives for all jurisdictions continue to be in support of life safety, incident stabilization, protection of property and the economy, and preservation of culture and the environment. The sustained response will likely include a focus on:

- Media and public information coordination.
- Maintaining lifeline stabilization targets.
- Increased information management needs.
- Sustained law enforcement response.
- Ongoing intelligence and investigation activities.
- Management of healthcare surge capacity and stabilization plans.
- Witness management; including interviews, personal effects management, and returns.
- Support services for witnesses, responders, and the public, including mental and behavioral health as well as spiritual care.
- Development and operations of family assistance centers (FAC).
- Fatality management services; including victim identification, processing, storage, and family notifications.

4.1.4 TRANSITION TO RECOVERY

Recovery transition may be a slow process depending on the type and the size of the incident. This process will be determined at the time of the incident. The State of Hawai'i is following the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 3000 recommendations of organizing recovery into three major subcategories:

- Immediate Recovery
- Early Recovery
- Continued Recovery



4.1.4.1 IMMEDIATE RECOVERY

Immediate recovery may include a focus on:

- Media and public information coordination
- Finalizing lifeline stabilization targets
- Event response documentation consolidation and evaluation
- Sustained witness management and support services
- Sustained family assistance center operations, including victim assistance protocols
- Reestablishing normal municipal operational standards and expectations
- Operational security and public safety protocols
- Damage assessment

Damage assessment protocols will follow recommendations of the NFPA 3000 and include:

- Civilian and responder casualties
- Bystander and witness effects
- Damage to infrastructure
- Damage to responding organizations
- Geographical area closures
- Business impact
- Victim populations affected, which may include:
 - Children and youth
 - First responders
 - Native Hawai‘ian communities
 - Elderly (kupuna) populations
 - Individuals with disabilities or other access and functional needs
 - Individuals who are deaf or hard of hearing
 - Individuals with limited English proficiency
 - High-risk populations
 - Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer populations
 - Military veterans
 - Underserved and socially isolated populations, including those historically underserved due to race, socio-economic status, disability, or sexual orientation
 - Undocumented populations
 - Other specialized populations

4.1.4.2 EARLY RECOVERY

Early recovery is defined as the operational period after immediate recovery where processes for agency coordination, meeting protocols, accountability, initial damage assessment, and primary victim assistance, including reunification and notifications, are actively being managed.

Early recovery may include a focus on:

- Operational security
- Damage assessment
- Public information coordination
- Resource needs analysis
- Analysis of event consequences



- Cascading event threats
- Volunteer management
- Donations management
- Victim advocacy, assistance, and services
- Federal emergency funding opportunities and grants

A resource needs analysis will be conducted to plan for ongoing recovery operations. Resource needs analysis will include:

- Potential deaths and injuries
- Business impact
- Mental and emotional requirements
- Property damage
- System or geographical area disruptions
- Investigation and scene control management

4.1.4.3 CONTINUING RECOVERY

Continuing recovery is defined as the operational periods after early recovery when previous recovery efforts have been stabilized.

Continuing recovery may include a focus on:

- Business impact evaluation
- Coordination of the restoration, rebuilding, and replacement of facilities, infrastructure, materials, equipment, tools, vendors, and suppliers
- Restoration of the supply chain
- Reopening or relocation of vital facilities
- Continuation of communications with stakeholders and the public
- Roles and responsibilities of the individuals implementing the recovery strategies
- Internal and external (vendors and contractor) personnel
- Adequate controls to prevent corruption or unlawful access to data during recovery
- Investigation of fraud associated with disaster assistance and assurances of consumer protection
- Maintenance of pre-incident controls
- Long-term community resiliency
- Volunteer and donation management
- Identification of gaps that require supplemental state or federal assistance
- Cost recovery



5. DIRECTION, CONTROL AND COORDINATION

The Governor has primary direction, control, and coordination of all state resources and is responsible for the safety and welfare of Hawaii's residents and visitors, as well as the continuity of state government and requesting federal assistance.

The Incident Commander, assisted by a staff sufficient for the tasks to be performed, will manage the emergency response at the incident site from an Incident Command Post (ICP). If multiple incident locations are involved, multiple incident command operations may be established.

All threats and acts of terrorism are criminal events. The FBI is the lead federal agency for criminal investigations of terrorist acts or terrorist threats and intelligence collection activities within the U.S., including in the state of Hawai'i.

Local and state authorities always maintain control of their response resources and continue to operate while the FBI integrates into the on-scene emergency management system.

5.1 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM

Use of the Incident Command System (ICS) is required by all emergency response agencies when responding to actual or suspected terrorist events.

If there is a local incident site, an ICP will be established to manage emergency operations at that site. The ranking official from the agency with primary responsibility for the incident will establish incident command and assume the position of Incident Commander.

The ICP is responsible for the coordination and deployment of scene response activities. Incident response priorities will include:

- Life safety
- Scene stabilization
- Conservation of property and resources

The Incident Commander will direct and control responding resources and designate emergency operating areas. Typical operating area boundaries established for a terrorist or targeted violence incident may include:

Crime Scene Boundary: Defines the crime scene area. The crime scene may also be referred to as the "red zone" or "working point." Access to the crime scene may be restricted by state, federal, or local law enforcement personnel. Response activities within the crime scene may require special care to protect evidence.

Hazardous Materials (Hazmat) Boundary: Defines the hazmat site, which may also be referred to as the "hot zone," "isolation area," or "exclusion zone." The hazmat area may also include the upwind "warm zone" utilized for contamination control and rescue staging. Depending on the spread of contaminants, the hazmat site may include some of (or the entire) crime scene. Entry into the hazmat boundary is



normally restricted to response personnel equipped with personal protective equipment and using decontamination procedures.

Incident Boundary: Includes the crime scene, the hazmat area, and the “cool zone” or “support zone” used for incident support operations such as resource staging and casualty collection. Additionally, areas where protective actions (such as shelter-in-place or evacuation) may be recommended, or mandatory measures (such as quarantine) may be imposed inside the incident boundary. Access to this area is normally controlled. If a quarantine is implemented, egress may also be restricted.

As other response disciplines and/or state and federal responders arrive at the ICP to support field operations and incident management, the Incident Commander will transition to a unified command.

The Incident Commander and the EOC/SEOC will divide the responsibilities of incident management.

- The Incident Commander will manage field operations at the incident site and in adjacent areas.
- The EOC will mobilize and provide local resources, disseminate emergency public information, organize and implement large-scale evacuation, coordinate care for casualties, coordinate shelter and mass care for evacuees, arrange mortuary support, and request assistance from other jurisdictions or state/federal partners, if necessary.

Representation of fire, law enforcement, and medical responders is necessary at the ICP to allow for the transition from threat neutralization and lifesaving measures to crime scene investigation.

With the arrival of state and federal responders, the FBI may establish a Joint Field Office (JFO) for overall coordination and management of response operations between government agencies and response partners from the private sector.

The need for a State Disaster Recovery Coordinator will be determined and, if activated, placed inside UC until the command is disbanded.

5.2 STATE EMERGENCY RESPONSE OPERATIONS

The SEOC may be fully or partially activated by HI-EMA for any terrorist or targeted violence threat or actualized incident. Local EOCs will notify the SEOC for activation.

SEOC activation enables representatives from key state agencies to coordinate information with local, federal, and supporting state agencies as dictated by the situation.

The Governor’s HSA/DHSA (organizationally located in OHS with support through their HSFC) – hereinafter OHS - augments HI-EMA’s (consequence management) efforts with coordination and subject matter expertise relative to terrorism and targeted violence incidents and enables representatives from key state agencies to coordinate homeland security and law enforcement information with local, federal, and supporting state agencies in such situations. OHS may physically augment the SEOC or the DLE DOC depending on situational requirements.

When an incident no longer requires the support and coordination functions provided by the SEOC, or those functions can be effectively managed by individual agencies using regular coordination mechanisms, deactivation occurs.

Deactivation of the state’s response and demobilization of deployed state personnel will be at the direction of the Director of Emergency Management after coordination with the affected local jurisdictions. Deactivation of specific assets, operations, or facilities may be staged as conditions warrant.



After-action review and improvement planning is arranged as part of deactivation planning.

5.3 COORDINATION OF CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES

Consequence management includes measures to protect public health and safety, restore essential services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of terrorism.

Consequence management will be coordinated by both the local affected jurisdiction and the state through unified command. The state may seek federal assistance if needed.

Law enforcement agencies involved in consequence management will inform response and recovery agencies of decisions made that may have implications for resource management.

Until crisis management activities have been concluded, law enforcement will participate in unified command or EOC operations to support consequence management activities involving the protection of the crime scene, evidence collection, and investigative processes.



6. INFORMATION COLLECTION, ANALYSIS AND DISSEMINATION

Developing a Common Operation Picture (COP) for response partners is essential in ensuring effective and coordinated response and recovery operations.

Potential and actualized threat information will be collected, evaluated, and disseminated to critical stakeholders to provide a COP.

Information storage and handling will be carried out in accordance with procedures outlined in the *SEOP*.

6.1 MONITORING AND PRE-INCIDENT DETECTION

Although all people in the State of Hawai'i have some responsibility for monitoring and reporting observed threats, the responsibility of coordinating threat reporting and information analysis falls under the direction of OHS via the HSFC, which manages the **Targeted Violence Prevention Program** and implements the state's **Targeted Violence Prevention Strategy**.

The HSFC is tasked with gathering information and intelligence, providing analysis, and advising on threats, including notifying individuals, agencies, and organizations as necessary.

The HSFC monitors statewide threat indicators and trends, including terrorism and targeted violence. Additionally, the HSFC works in conjunction with partner agencies and coalitions to monitor additional topics such as child abductions and school threats.

The primary jurisdiction of HSFC responsibility is limited to Hawai'i; however, the HSFC monitors situations outside of the state, including international and domestic threats for situational awareness and insight on threats to Hawai'i.

6.2 NOTIFICATION

After threat information is validated, initial threat information is immediately disseminated to relevant partner agencies. Dissemination methods and recipients will depend on the specific threat information as well as potential impacts.

The recipients of intelligence notifications are situation dependent. Notifications may be immediate or may take time depending on the situation. It is important that information is shared in a way that delivers crucial messages but does not escalate public fear.

Threat reporting is not standardized; rather, it is at the discretion of OHS to identify recipients of a potential threat or intelligence information. All state-level threats are communicated to the Governor, who will then decide processes for statewide dissemination.

Terrorism events, like all disasters, start and end at the local level. Recipients of threat notifications or intelligence must include County Warning Points (CWP) and local Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) to



ensure operational readiness. Should a potential threat escalate past the county level, the local EOC will notify OHS and the SEOC for activation.

At the time of a tangible threat, the Fusion Center will set up an HSIN room to coordinate information needs. The HSFC, under the direction of OHS, will grant access permission based on the threat and will include relevant partners such as:

- Other fusion centers
- OHS
- County partners

WebEOC will be used for tracking information that can be broadly disseminated, while sensitive information is managed through HSIN.

- WebEOC is accessible only during an EOC activation and may not be available for potential threats that have not yet occurred.
- HSIN is a secure platform with a specified audience and can be accessed at any time after the creation of a secure room.

6.2.1 KEY AGENCIES

The SWP is the communication warning center for the state. The SWP may be notified of an actualized threat via the National Warning System (NAWAS) and should be updated on the situation for record-keeping for anything beyond normal operational activities.

After notification, SWP is responsible for sharing disseminated information with relevant state partners, including HI-EMA and OHS leadership for activation and coordination via the Hawai'i Warning System (HAWAS). HAWAS is used to transmit and receive emergency messages from the local EOC and CWPs.

Additional horizontal information sharing through OHS may include agencies such as (depending on the identified threat or specific situation):

- HI-EMA
- National Guard
- State military outposts

Vertical information sharing through OHS may include (depending on the identified threat):

- Governor*
- Director of Emergency Management
- FBI
- DHS
- National Intelligence Council*
- Other federal partners as necessary

*Any intelligence shared with the Governor must also be shared with the federal National Intelligence Council, which maintains continuous monitoring of potential and actualized threats.

6.2.2 SYSTEM/NOTIFICATION TOOLS

Systems that can be utilized to share information about a potential or actualized threat include:

- HSIN



- Phone
- Official paper or memo
- Email
- In-person meetings
- Notification of HSA/DHSA for dissemination to critical partners

The National Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS) issues alerts through state and local partners and the media directly to the public. NTAS utilizes the following channels to disseminate information:

- The official DHS NTAS webpage
- Email signup
- Social media

Providing state support in disseminating threat information from NTAS may include publishing information on official state websites and re-tweeting or re-posting information on social media.



7. PLAN DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE

7.1 RESPONSIBILITIES

Under the Hawai'i Revised Statutes, Title 10, Chapter 128A, OHS is responsible for preparing comprehensive plans for homeland security and defense that integrate with related plans at all levels of government. This Plan falls under that mandate.

OHS is responsible for coordinating all revisions of the Terrorism and Targeted Violence Plan. Plan maintenance responsibilities include:

- Maintaining a plan review cycle as described in the next section.
- Reviewing all plan components and proposed changes for accuracy and consistency.
- Obtaining approvals for any changes that directly impact any agency other than OHS.
- Ensuring notifications of approved changes are made and maintaining a record of changes.
- Submitting all revisions to HI-EMA, which has overall responsibility for the SEOP Basic Plan, to which this document is an Annex.

All plan updates must be approved by the OHS Administrator.

7.2 REVIEW CYCLE

OHS will complete regular review of this Plan each year. Regular updates are likely to include any of the following:

- Minor administrative revisions needed to update terminology, titles, or agency names.
- Changes to the current realities of risk and vulnerability analyses, planning assumptions, and the overall homeland security situation.
- Additions of relevant case studies as they occur throughout Hawai'i, the U.S., and worldwide.
- Changes in federal or state laws, policies, structures, capabilities, or other changes to emergency management standards or best practices.
- Incorporate substantive lessons learned from exercises, incident analysis, or program evaluations.

OHS will document any regular review of the Terrorism and Targeted Violence Plan as part of the record of changes, even if no changes are made to the document because of the review. In such cases, OHS will note in the record of changes the date of the review and that all information was validated as remaining accurate and current.

In addition to the regular review cycle, OHS commits to reviewing the Terrorism and Targeted Violence Plan regularly. OHS will be responsible for identifying when an update is warranted. It is recommended that the considerations for updating the plan should be made after:

- Any real-world incident that activates the plan.
- Any exercise that uses or references the plan.
- As a part of the annual plans review.



8. AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES

8.1 STATE LAWS, REGULATIONS AND DIRECTIVES

1. Administrative Directive No. 15-01: *Emergency Management Preparedness Policies for Departments*.
2. 2017 Hawai'i Revised Statutes. *Title 10. Chapter 127A: Emergency Management*.
3. 2017 Hawai'i Revised Statutes. *Title 10. Chapter 128A: Homeland Security*.

8.2 FEDERAL LAWS, REGULATIONS, DIRECTIVES, AND REFERENCES

1. DHS. *Mass Attacks in Public Spaces*.
2. DHS. *Planning Considerations: Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attacks*.
3. DHS. *Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Targeted Violence*.
4. FEMA. *National Response Framework: Terrorism Incident Law Enforcement and Investigation Plan*.
5. Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD-7). *Critical Infrastructure, Prioritization, and Protection*.
6. Public Law 104-201. *Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act*.

8.3 OTHER REFERENCES

1. OHS, Hawai'i *Targeted Violence Prevention Strategy*, 2022.
2. OHS, Hawai'i *Targeted Violence Prevention Strategy Implementation Plan*, 2024.
3. Crime Victims Compensation Commission, *Mass Violence Incident Response Plan*, September 6, 2024.
4. DHS, *Planning Considerations: Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attacks*, July 2018.
5. DHS, *Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Targeted Violence*, September 2019.
6. FBI, *Active Shooter Resources*.
7. FBI, *Countering Violence Extremism*.
8. National Fire Protection Association 3000. *Standard for an Active Shooter/Hostile Event Response (ASHER) Program*.
9. National Terrorism Advisory System, *NTAS Guide: National Terrorism Advisory System Public Guide*, April 2011.